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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICEs-RoBINsoN-PATMAN Acr-PAYMENTS FOR ADVERTISING UNDER SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e)-Plaintiffs, wholesale and retail
grocers, brought a class action for treble damages and injunctive relieflunder sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 Defendantsuppliers of defendant-A & P Co. had paid for advertising in Woman's
Day, a magazine published by a wholly-owned subsidiary of A & P, without
making a corresponding allowance available to plaintiffs who had no
similar publication. The district court found no violation of section 2(e)
since the suppliers were not contributing to the furnishing of a discriminatory service within the meaning of that section.3 Because the advertising was designed primarily to aid defendant-suppliers, with A & P gleaning only incidental benefits which also accrued to its competitors, there
was also no granting of a payment upon proportionally unequal terms as
prohibited by section 2(d).4 Moreover, since plaintiffs did not themselves

provided in 38 Stat. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§15, 26.
Amendatory of the Clayton Act, 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13.
3 Section 2(e) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor
of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms."
4 Section 2(d) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer
of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
1 As

2
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furnish similar services, they had no standing to complain of discrimination.
On appeal, held, affirmed as to the section 2(e) ruling, reversed as to the
section 2(d) ruling, one judge dissenting.5 To avoid violation of section
2(d), defendant-suppliers needed to make payments available on proportionally equal terms t'o other customers competing with A & P. Plaintiffs'
failure to publish a magazine did not relieve defendants from liability.
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, (7th Cir.
1958) 258 F. (2d) 831.
The rapidly increasing power of the great chain stores and a resultant
fear for the welfare of the independant merchant6 gave rise to the Robinson-Patman Act which was aimed at curtailing unfair competition via price
discrimination, both direct and indirect. The power of the chains was making itself felt in terms of discriminatory rebates, services, and allowances
granted them by their suppliers. The particular stimulus for the inclusion
of sections 2(d) and 2(e) was the prevalence of advertising allowances and
promotional services which enabled these organizations to shift a portion of
their selling costs to the suppliers and thereby gain a competitive advantage over their smaller rivals. 7 Section 2(d) proscribes the granting by suppliers of unequal or unproportionalized payments for services or facilities
provided by customers competing with each other, while section 2(e) prohibits the discriminatory furnishing of services or facilities to such competing customers. The affirm.ance in the principal case of the finding of no
violation of section 2(e) by defendant-suppliers appears correct. The mere
purchasing of advertising space in the magazine would not reasonably
seem to constitute the granting or furnishing of a "service" or "facility"
to a purchaser within the purview of section 2(e).8
The interpretation of section 2(d), however, causes more difficulty.
While numerous problems have arisen from the attempted application of
this section, the phrase "proportionally equal terms" has proved the most
perplexing.9 Although the apparent purpose of these words was to prohibit

The opinion does not disclose the basis of the dissent.
See generally, S. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1934) FTC Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation; FELDMAN AND ZORN, 'ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr: ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL AI.LowANCES·92 (1948); Rowe, "The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A
Twenty-Year Perspective," 57 CoL. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
7H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15, 16 (1936). See also S. Rep. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d sess. (1936); 80 CONG. REc. 7759, 8123, 9418, 9561 (1936); FELDMAN AND ZORN,
ROBINSON-PAT!IIAN Acr: ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL .ALLOWANCES 91 (1948).
8 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988;
American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38; Chicago
Seating Co. v. S. Karpen &: Bros., (7th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 863; In the Matter of Luxor,
Ltd., FTC Dkt. 3736 (1940). See also, FELDMAN AND ZORN, ROBINSON-PAT!IIAN Acr: ADVERTIS•
ING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 89, 139 (1948); Fisher, "Sections 2(d) and (e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited,'' 11 VAND. L. REv. 453 at 481 ·(1958).
9 Note that the discussion ,regarding §2(d) applies equally to the identical language
of §2(e), as both have -been interpreted in the same way by the courts.
5
6
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the favoring of certain customers through indirect means such as payments
exceeding the worth of the service or facility provided, no legislative standard was provided by which compliance with the requirement was to be
measured. 10 The cases clearly indicate that either the furnishing of a payment which cannot be proportionalized so as to be made available to all
competing customers, or the refusal to proportionalize the terms upon
which payment is granted, is a failure to comply with the statute. 11 In
other words, a supplier cannot tailor a money grant so that only a few
customers will be able to take advantage of it, even though it may be offered
to all. Since the payment for advertising space in Woman's Day falls within
this prohibition, the court concluded that failure of plaintiffs to publish
a magazine did not relieve defendants from making some sort of allowance
available to them.
The objection to the decision in the principal case is not that it fails to
follow existing precedent but, on the contrary, that it perpetuates the interpretation of section 2(d) as a "per se" section; that is, violation of its
terms is not excused by the fact that there has been no injury to competition even though such a defense is available in prosecutions under section
2(a) of the act.12 The reasoning behind this interpretation is that the failure
to make payments available on proportionally equal terms is in its nature
discriminatory and, therefore, injurious to competition "per se." In addition, it has been suggested that the purpose of sections 2(d) and 2(e) was to
prohibit accomplishing indirectly what cannot be done directly because of
section 2(a).13 The difficulty of proof as to the injurious effects of discrimination under sections 2(d) and 2(e) has led to the belief that to allow this defense would be ultimately to destroy the effectiveness of section 2(a). As has

10 H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936);
80 CONG. R.Ec. 3231, 9561 (1936); FELDMAN AND ZORN, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: ADVERTISING
AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES 93 (1948); Fisher, "Sections 2(d) and (e) of the RobinsonPatman Act: Babel ,Revisited," 11 VAND. L. REV. 453 at 468 (1958); Smith, "The Patman
Act in Practice,'' 35 MICH. L. REV. 705 at 726 (1937}; FTC Dkt. 5226, 5243; comment, 46
YALE L. J. 447 at 465 (1937).
11 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., note 8 supra; American Can Co. v.
Russellville Canning Co., note 8 supra. See also Russellville Canning Co. v. American
Can Co., (W.D. Ark. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 484; 80 CONG. REC. 3231, 9416 (1936). But the
terms offered need not be identical or tailored so that every purchaser can take advantage
of every feature. See FTC Dkt. 5585-5587; AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 136 (1950).
12 E.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 132, cert. den. 331
U.S. 806 (1947); United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1952)
107 F. Supp. 89. See also AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRllllINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 116 (1950); Greenberg, "Indirect Price Differences and the
Robinson-Patman Act: Anomalies Compounded," 28 PA. B.A.Q. 265 (1957). Section 2(a)
prohibits direct or indirect price discrimination between purchasers of like grade and
quality which has an adverse effect on competition, and which cannot be justified on
the basis of a cost saving.
13 H. Rep. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956).
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been pointed out in support of an amendment of these sections, however,
the real aim of Congress was to eliminate unearned payments resulting in
discrimination, not to disallow advantages gained pursuant to the rules of
fair and open competition.14 The undesirable result that the courts reach
under the present interpretation is well illustrated by the principal case.
Defendants received full value for their payments, obtained the primary
benefits of the advertising, and paid on the same terms as advertisers who
did not deal with A & P as a customer.15 Yet the courts have determined
that when a retail organization is paid a fair price for a service which only
it is equipped to provide, and the supplier enters the transaction solely for
his own legitimate business benefit, the transaction is nevertheless within
the prohibition of section 2(d) because the retailer may also be benefited.16
Surely this is a perversion of the purpose of the statute. In the interpretation of section 2(d), the courts have carried the operation of the act beyond
its originally intended limits. The principal case, while in accord with the
present state of the law, points up the need for a re-evaluation of the Robinson-Patman Act in this area.
Robert Segar

14 Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" N.Y. STATE BAR
AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 142 (1948). See also Rowe, "Price Discrimination,
Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman," 60 YALE L. J. 929 at
959 (1951); LEVY, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr-A YEAR'S RETROSPECT (1937).
15 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (N.D. Ill. 1957) 154
F. Supp. 471 at 497.
16 There is a strong hint in •the legislative history •that the act was intended to cover
this situation if the customer derives equal benefits to his own business. See H. Rep. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7 (1936). This was
admittedly not true in the principal case.

